February 16, 2011
By Staff Reporter
Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams, Ulster Unionist leader David Trimble, and the leaders of the Irish and British governments, Bertie Ahern and Tony Blair, were visibly united in the deep sense of letdown.
Before the hoped-for breakthrough turned into a crisis, they had been united in a more positive way. Though all were cautious, wary of hyping their expectations of a momentous moment, there was a feeling of optimism produced in part by the long meetings between Trimble and Adams that seemed to presage a new level of understanding between the two traditions of republicanism and unionism. Indeed, on the day when breakthrough turned into breakdown, an Adams speech had signaled that republicans had indeed found common ground with their fellow Irishmen of the unionist persuasion.
One would have supposed that by the big day, all sides would have been fully appraised of what was expected of them. Yet, when Gen. de Chastelain emerged with a long face to announce that the IRA had completed another act of decommissioning, but without being able to provide the kind of details that Trimble had been expecting, it was clear something was badly amiss. Several questions arise. Had Trimble failed to make clear to Adams, after all those talks, what he was expecting? One might ask, how could the parties not have been aware of the parameters of de Chastelain’s remit, which did not allow him to breach the confidentially imposed by the IRA on its decommissioning acts?
The failure is a collective one. But it has compromised Gen. de Chastelain, and exposed Trimble’s leadership. It has also made the supposed new understanding between unionists and republicans look somewhat less than comprehensive.
It is doubly frustrating in that the IRA’s act is substantial enough to make all this agony unnecessary. All it takes is for it to spell it out.