Whitewash?

However, the report has come in for criticism from a number of quarters. Most notable has been that of retired Irish army intelligence officer Lt. Col. John Morgan. He insists that the attacks had to be carried out with the involvement of the British army. This is despite the finding by Barron that while collusion may well have happened that it remains “not proven.”
Morgan came to his conclusions about the Dublin and Monaghan bombings while in his role as head of security at Irish army intelligence in the 1980s.
Morgan believes that the attacks were carried out with the connivance of the British Army and RUC. While the UVF claimed in 1993 that it alone carried out the bombing runs, Morgan, applying his own military analysis to the bombings, concludes that only trained British military figures could have conceived of the plot.
He was recently interviewed by Judge Henry Barron as part of his inquiry into the attacks. Morgan maintains that not only is Barron’s report significantly lacking in proper, considered analysis, but that it misrepresents his own evidence. He claims that Barron misattributes evidence to him and failed to consult with him prior to publication.
Morgan believes the report has damaged his own reputation and is considering taking the matter to the courts. In particular the report makes reference to Morgan meeting with a member of British intelligence linked to the bombing. Morgan said he never told Barron this and that the meeting never took place. He said that had Barron allowed him an opportunity to confirm his evidence prior to publication, the problem could have been cleared up. The report actually states that all witnesses had been approached a second time in order to ensure that the report accurately reflected their views. Morgan said this never happened.
He has also noted that the report uses unconstitutional language. On two occasions Barron, a senior Irish judge, refers to “mainland Britain.”
Morgan insists that Barron has also overlooked important aspects of the bombings and failed to interview important military analysts. He claims that Barron should have had an Irish army officer advisor seconded to the inquiry in order to enable him to sift through the detailed military analysis.
“I asked him to send my papers to the army so that they could adjudicate on them. As far as I can see he made no effort to do that,” Morgan said.
Morgan continues to dispute Barron’s conclusions.
“The bombings had all the hallmarks of a military operation as distinct from a paramilitary one,” he said. “For example, there were two bomb-assembly areas. The bombing teams took the smuggler’s route on the way to Dublin avoiding all built-up areas. They also knew that the Boyne Bridge would be open. The cars, which were stolen in Belfast all retained their original registration plates — so to distract attention away from Portadown — the seat of the operation. On arriving in Dublin the cars and the truck carrying the bombs married up at either the Coachman’s Inn or Whitehall Chapel car park.
“The placement of the bombs also strongly suggests a military mind at work. The three streets — Parnell Street, South Leinster Street and Talbot Street — all lead to bus and train termini. Had there not been a bus strike called on the day of the bombing, then hundreds could have conceivably been killed. The bombs were also planted sufficiently far apart so if one car were to be ‘sussed,’ the others would escape attention in the ensuing hue and cry. The size of the bombs were also in proportion with the size of each street.
“In respect to the Monaghan attack, every military operation requires a main attack and a supporting attack,” he said. “The Monaghan bombing had the effect of drawing the authorities to the scene of the bombing thus allowing the Dublin bomb team to make it safely across the border.”
Morgan believes that his analysis of the attacks has been unduly ignored in Barron’s conclusions. He said that the report wrongly suggests that loyalists could have carried out the attacks without assistance. This, he believes, is simply not possible.
He also points out that Barron appears to have not interviewed at least one respected military analyst who supports Morgan’s thesis. U.S. military bomb disposal expert Ed Komac has argued, like Morgan, that the bombings were a military operation.
“Komac made an offer to come to Ireland at his own expense to discuss his findings,” Morgan said. “It’s amazing that he doesn’t appear to have been interviewed.”
Morgan said, since airing his views on the attacks in the early 1990s, he has been hounded by the Garda special branch, which, he believes, has tapped his phone and conducted surveillance operations against him.
“The surveillance has been going on all the time,” he said. “They routinely tap my phone and carry out surveillance operations against me.”
He reports repeated attempts by the authorities to intercept his phone calls and mail. He also claims to have been followed on occasion by Special Branch officers.
He has also made the difficult decision not to cooperate with the Dail subcommittee currently examining Barron’s report. He believes the scope of the inquiry is too limited and that it does not have sufficient time to properly examine the bombings.
He informed the committee of his decision last Thursday. “There is nothing personal in my decision,” he said. “I found the committee members to be open, civil and fair. I just believe they have been handed a poisoned chalice. The guidelines set down for the subcommittee does not allow it to examine the bombings themselves — only the substance of Barron’s actual report.
“With respect to the inaccurate references to me in Barron’s report, an apology will not suffice — it’s an amendment I need. My honor has been impugned in the report.”